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Although current quality assurance systems such as Task Group 142 of the American
Association of Physicists in Medicine and other methods used for radiotherapy
have greatly contributed to decreasing radiotherapy incidents, there is still scope for
improvement. In this study, we attempted to evaluate the reliability of the risk priority
number, which was suggested by the AAPM Task Group 100, when it was calculated
by an expert group in Korea. By doing this, we aimed at providing preliminary data for
applying Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), a systematic approach to identify
potential failures in Korea. For this purpose, 1,163 incidents data in the Radiation
Oncology Safety Information System (ROSIS) database were used. The incident data
were categorized into 144 items to create a questionnaire. The expert group consisted
of 19 physicists who evaluated the occurrence (O), severity (S), and detectability (D) of
each item on a scale from 1 to 10 according to the AAPM Task Group 100. Among
these three factors, the values of “O × D” were compared with ROSIS data. When
comparing the O × D value between the items ranked in the top 10 of the survey
and ROSIS data, no items were duplicated, and “simulation” and “treatment” were most
frequent among, in total, eight processes. The average difference of O × D between the
survey and ROSIS data was 0.8 ± 1.5, and this difference barely followed a Gaussian
distribution. The results of this work indicates that FMEA is a good predictor, but that
there were still deviations between actual risk and expectations in some cases, because
actual incidents are multifactorial rather than simply proportional to D and O. Further
research on radiotherapy risk estimation is needed.
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INTRODUCTION
Advances in radiotherapy techniques have enabled high-precision radiotherapy, which minimizes
the unnecessary irradiation of unaffected tissue surrounding the target volume [1, 2]. However,
advanced technology has not only brought clinical advantages, but also come with the needs
for more precise, unfailing delivery. Therefore, an incident prevention program is necessary
in radiotherapy, as in other high technology applications, because a small incident in such
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an industry can cause fatal results [3, 4]. There is no doubt
that a quality assurance system such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency’s “A Handbook for Teachers and Students,”
European Radiation Protection Agency Report # 91 (RP-91),
and the American Association of Physicists in Medicine TG-
142 have greatly contributed to reducing the radiation therapy
accidents. Furthermore, several international external quality
audit program are running to improve the safety culture
in radiotherapy, too [5–7]. Furthermore, several international
external quality audit program are running to improve the safety
culture in radiotherapy [8–11]. However, there still exist potential
risks in the radiotherapy process, requiring improvement in the
radiotherapy-related risk management. [12]. First, QA systems
mainly check hardware problems, and therefore it is difficult to
prevent non-hardware problems such as systemic error or human
error, which are the leading causes of incidents [13, 14]. The
radiotherapy procedure consists of several steps, each of which
uses complex technology involving multidisciplinary members
(medical doctor, nurse, radiation therapist, medical physicist,
dosimetrist, etc.,). Thus, it is difficult to ensure safety and quality
of treatment when only technical problems are checked. Second,
current QA protocols are laborious and time-consuming, as
they contain too many items to be checked on a routine basis.
Therefore, a different QA method is necessary to thoroughly and
effectively reduce the possibility of radiotherapy incidents.
Changing the working environment and workflow through
a process-oriented incident cause analysis can minimize
the frequency of incidents and maximize the possibility of
incident detection. The demand for a process-oriented incident
prevention system has led to the research on failure modes
and effect analysis (FMEA) [15–17], a prospective risk analysis
FIGURE 1 | Evaluation of the “occurrence (O),” “severity (S),” “detectability (D),” and “risk priority number (RPN)” for 144 items on a scale from 1 to 10 according to the
proposed AAPM TG-100 rating scales.
approach routinely employed in several manufacturing sectors.
FMEA is now being actively carried out in radiotherapy to reduce
incidents [18]. In FMEA, an expert group is to determine possible
failure modes and evaluate their “occurrence” (O), “severity” (S),
and “detection” (D) on a scale of 1–10 to assess risk priority by
listing the failure modes in descending order of the risk priority
number (RPN= O× S× D).
Even though an expert group consists of qualified experts, it
is still necessary to confirm the reliability of their scoring because
FMEA is based on the RPN score, which is a result of expert group
scoring. The aim of the study is to assess the reliability of the risk
priority number determined by an expert group and to provide
preliminary data for FMEA application in Korea. Therefore, we
evaluated the reliability of the expert group scoring by comparing
the expert group survey results to the Radiation Oncology Safety
Information System (ROSIS) database.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
ROSIS Data Classification and Expert
Group Survey
To confirm the validity of an expert group survey results,
we performed a comparison with actual radiotherapy incident
data reported in ROSIS (1,163 radiotherapy incidents for a
duration of 11 years: 2003–2013) [19]. To create a questionnaire,
the ROSIS incident data were divided into 144 items. As
the survey target was medical physicists who work in Korea,
some incident types in the ROSIS data that did not apply to
current radiotherapy techniques in Korea were filtered out. The
items were classified into intensity-modulated radiation therapy
(IMRT), brachytherapy, and mechanical failure, and further
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TABLE 1 | Top 10 RPN items of expert group survey.
Expert group survey
Rank Process Incident RPN
1 Treatment Patient movement during treatment 32.4
2 Prescription Miss in target contouring 31.4
3 Patient QA Replan not conducted despite patient
condition change
25.6
4 Consulting Incorrect documentation in patient chart 25.0
5 Simulation Saved CT image in different patient
name
22.9
6 Prescription Target position error caused by an
obscure radiographic image reading
22.4
7 Consulting Prescribe without considering
radiotherapy history
21.3
8 Treatment Incorrect bolus thickness 20.4
9 Others Unfamiliar with new treatment technique 20.4
10 Prescription Wrong prescribed dose 19.9
FIGURE 2 | Difference between ROSIS data and expert survey.
subdivided into IMRT procedures (consulting, simulation, dose
prescription, radiotherapy planning, patient QA, and treatment)
and brachytherapy procedures (prescription and treatment
planning, treatment preparation, placement of the brachytherapy
source applicators, and treatment delivery). Respondents were
requested to evaluate O, S, and D of each item on a scale
from 1 to 10 according to the proposed AAPM Task Group-
100 rating scales. Higher O and S indicate a higher probability
of occurrence and higher severity, whereas higher D indicates a
lower probability of detection. In total, 19medical physicists from
19 different organizations in Korea participated in the survey
as respondents.
Comparison of ROSIS and Expert Survey
To compare the expert group survey data with ROSIS data, its
items should be sorted according to the number of incidents
for each item. Because there were too many ROSIS items that
had only one incident (28.8%), the frequency was not evenly
distributed enough to be classified into 10 grades. Therefore, a
FIGURE 3 | Difference between ROSIS data and expert survey for
detectability item.
scale of 1–5 was chosen instead of 1–10, and each ROSIS itemwas
re-classified into the 1–5 grades. A lower grade indicates higher
detectability. The survey result was also fit to the 1–5 scales.
The differences between the survey results and ROSIS data for
each item were rounded. Among the three factors (O, S, D) that
determine RPN, D, and D×Owere compared because detection
and occurrence were clear, and the number of incidents per item
is a complex measure of several factors, including the difficulty of
detection and the probability of occurrence.
RESULTS
Expert Group Survey Results
The items that scored the highest O, S, and D in the survey
were “starting treatment before patient QAwas performed” in the
patient QA process, “multi-leaf collimator (MLC) information
was not sent to the treatment machine” in the treatment process,
and “target contouring error” in the dose prescription process,
respectively. The highest RPN was 32.4 and the lowest was 3.5.
The item with the highest RPN score was “patient movement
during treatment” in the treatment process (O = 2.84, S =
4.42, D = 2.58) and the item with the lowest RPN score was
“perform computed tomography simulation (CT-Sim) again as
information was not stored” in the simulation process (O= 1.63,
S = 1.37, D = 1.58). The mean (± standard deviation) of O, S,
and D was 1.77 ± 0.75 for O, 3.50 ± 1.01 for S, and 2.13 ±
1.30 for D. Compared to the distributions of O and D shown
in Figure 1, the distribution of S was relatively high, indicating
that the expert group felt that most incidents do not occur on
a daily basis; however, once an incident occurs, it can lead to
serious results (Figure 1). Three out of four items in the dose
prescription process were ranked in the top 10 highest RPN
items, and the fourth one was ranked at No. 21 (Table 1). For
those three items, the mean of O was close to the overall mean of
O, but the means of S and D were far above the overall means of S
and D, indicating that incidents in the dose prescription process
can be serious and difficult to detect.
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FIGURE 4 | Demonstration of the average D values of the expert group scoring and ROSIS results according to the radiotherapy procedure.
Comparison of Survey Results With ROSIS
Data
Although the ROSIS grade is a complexmeasure of several factors
including detectability and occurrence, we first compared the D
value itself to verify if there was a correlation. The difference in D
values between the expert survey and ROSIS data was 0.94± 1.51
per item, on an average. In total, 25 items had no difference, 85
items had a deviation below 1, and 30 items had a deviation above
3 (Figure 2). The expectation of the expert group and actual D
was identical in 79.2% of the items. However, D was tangential
to the ROSIS data in 20.8% of the items, indicating that the
number of incidents per item is multifactorial rather than simply
proportional to detectability.
Therefore, O × D was compared between the survey results
and ROSIS data, additionally considering the occurrence (O)
factor. For this comparison, the grades of D and ROSIS were
reversed so that higher grades would indicate higher frequencies.
The mean (± Standard Deviation) difference between O×D and
ROSIS grade was 0.79 ± 1.51. As occurrence and detectability
were both reflected, the difference decreased, but still showed
very low similarity in some items (Figure 3). The average D
values of the expert group scoring and ROSIS results according
to the radiotherapy procedure are demonstrated in Figure 4.
The p-values of each process were 0.265 for “consulting,”
0.327 for “simulation,” 0.238 for “prescription,” 0.085 for
“planning,” 0.238 for “patient QA,” and 0.276 for “treatment.”
Among the radiotherapy processes, “consulting,” “simulation,”
and “planning” had the most similar D value (difference = 0.3)
between the survey results and ROSIS data, while the “treatment”
process had the least similar D value (difference = 1.2). The
relatively larger differences in the treatment process may be
due to lack of diversity in the professionals who participated in
the survey and differences in treatment circumstance between
Europe and Korea. The survey group in this study may be
more biased than multidisciplinary group since it consisted of
medical physicists in Korea only. In other hands, the larger
differences in the treatment process may be due to differences
in treatment procedures between Europe and Korea. The highest
similarity in the “consulting,” “prescription,” and “planning”
processes can be explained in the same way because these
processes are reviewed during “chart check,” which is a duty
of the medical physicist before starting treatment. O × D of
“consulting” and “prescription” deviated from the ROSIS data,
but “planning” values in the survey results closely resembled
those in the ROSIS data. When comparing the O × D values
for the items ranked in the top 10 in each the expert group
survey results and ROSIS data, “simulation” and “treatment”
were the most frequently ranked radiotherapy processes in both
the survey and ROSIS data. Five out of the top 10 items belonged
to the simulation process in the survey, and 7 out of the top
10 belonged to the treatment process in ROSIS (Table 2). It
is likely that the “treatment” process was the most frequently
ranked process in ROSIS data because it is repeated 20–30 times
to finish one whole cycle, therefore, resulting in 20–30 times
higher possibility of incident occurrence. Furthermore, 56% of
the ROSIS incidents were found by the therapist (treatment
unit) [19]. Out of the 10 items in each process, none were
duplicated. As the respondents of the survey in this study were
Korean nationals and the ROSIS database mainly consisted of
incidents in European countries, the differences in the data
could arise from procedural or environmental differences [19].
For instance, “patient name was written differently from part
to part,” which is ranked second in the expert group survey
results, was caused by person-to-person variability in converting
patient names from Korean to English. The standard language
of most software programs used in radiotherapy procedures
such as treatment planning system is English, which is not a
native language in Korea. Because there is no specific rule on
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TABLE 2 | Items ranked in the top 10 in expert group survey (O*D) and ROSIS.
Expert group survey ROSIS
Process Incident O*D rank Process Incident #
Patient QA Start treatment before patient QA done 11.2 1 Treatment Incorrect patient set up 109
Simulation Patient name was written differently from part to part 9.0 2 Planning Calculation error 65
Mechanical problem 4D console stopped 8.4 3 Treatment Undesirable dose delivery 48
Simulation Insufficient scan range 8.3 4 Treatment Wrong field dimension 36
Simulation thermomask didn’t fix well on patient 7.8 5 Simulation Incorrect documentation in patient chart 35
Simulation incorrect location of reference marking 7.7 6 Treatment Bolus omitted 34
Simulation Collision during 3D simulation 7.3 7 Others Communication error 31
Mechanical problem Delayed linear accelerator reboot 7.3 8 Treatment Incorrect isocenter 30
Treatment Incorrectly labeled fields ex. RPO instead of RAO 7.2 9 Treatment Incorrect collimator angle 28
Patient QA Not checking thoroughly before treatment 7.0 10 Treatment Wrong block 27
how to spell Korean names in English, there is a chance of
such incidents when staff members write the patient names in
phonetic script.
DISCUSSION
The above results indicate that FMEA is a good predictor in
general, which has been useful in risk assessment and industrial
quality control and is now being introduced in specific areas
such as radiology. However, there were discrepancies between
the ROSIS data and expert group expectation in some cases.
This is because the number of actual incidents is likely to be
multifactorial, rather than simply proportional to “detectability”
and “occurrence.”
The composition of the expert group could be one of the
factors. Diversity in the professions of the expert group was
quite limited in this research although each of the multiple
steps in radiotherapy requires professionals with different
specialties. Due to a closed atmosphere regarding medical
accidents in Korea, the formation of an expert group from diverse
professional fields is rather difficult. If experts from various fields
could have been involved in the survey, expectations would
likely have been more accurate, and accurate expectations bring
about successful risk management through FMEA. Therefore,
to successfully adapt FMEA, radiologists, physicists, therapists,
dosimetrists, engineers, and nurses should participate. Moreover,
the selection of a comparison group could have mitigated
against the conformity of the survey to the ROSIS data. All
respondents were Korean, whereas the ROSIS database mainly
consists of incidents in European countries. There should
have been an inequality such as a frequent incident type,
working environment, or minute details in treatment procedure.
Therefore, it is necessary to use a radiotherapy incident database
from the same organization or the same country to achieve
higher accuracy.
In addition, there is an error-inducing factor in the ROSIS
data itself because the database completely relies on voluntary
reports from organizations. This implies that all incidents were
not reported. Therefore, the actual frequency of incidents could
differ from what can be achieved from the ROSIS data.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the expert group survey results had discrepancies
with the ROSIS data. There were several error-inducing factors,
such as the composition of the expert group, the environmental
differences between the countries, and the voluntary nature of
the ROSIS data. As medical environments differ by country,
medical environment-specific risk management is necessary
in addition to institution-specific risk management. FMEA is
an advanced prevention method which requires for an expert
group to have preliminary knowledge of possible incident
types. Therefore, although foreign radiotherapy incident
reports or databases could be a good reference to establish
a risk management system, this research demonstrates
that anticipating the risk of incidents based on foreign
data might not be appropriate for a specific institution.
Thus, further research on radiotherapy risk estimation
is necessary.
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